94 U.S. 103 (1935).
A second and complementary rule followed in many jurisdictions affords a defendant a new trial where the reviewing court is reasonably certain that testimony of a material witness is false; that, without it, the jury might have reached a different conclusion; that the defendant was taken by surprise with the false testimony and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. See, for example,
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.zd 8, 87 (1928). Reference to this rule, although
it is not based upon constitutional principles, is necessary to portray adequately the picture with regard to injurious perjured testimony and to place the rule of Mooney v. Holohan in its proper perspective.
'While this rule is attributed to Mooney v. Holohan, in reality it has grown from a principle announced in that case as mere dictum. Although the language of that dictum was broad, the fact the allegations accused the prosecutor, individually, of surpressing important evidence is the basis for the formulation of the rule.
* Use of the same words in formulating the rule without further explanation has created situations in which it is virtually impossible to detect substantive changes which may have existed in the minds of some judges. Yet, recent cases indicate that behind this facade of repetition changes must have transpired. It will be noted that many of the cases cited herein involve federal as well as state action. Although the scope of this note is limited to state action, the federal action cases are pertinent authority in that they are often cited inerchangeably with state action cases by the courts.
" Since the Mooney rule requires that the prosecution authorities know that perjured testimony was used against the defendant, those defendants asserting it generally allege participation by the prosecutor. The result is a process confusingly circuitous in that the more typical the case the more firmly entrenched becomes the rule, and as the rule becomes less flexible so the case arising under it becomes more stereotyped.
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[Vol. 7 : ISO stereotyped cases may, in turn, have induced many other courts, faced with situations involving other state officials, to ignore the broader ramifications of the rule.
. Some courts, however, have not felt constrained to accept a narrow interpretation of the Mooney rule, and, by expanding the meaning of the word "prosecution" or by rejecting its limiting implication completely, those courts have, construed the rule to embrace state agents other than prosecuting attorneys. 9 The first of these cases was Pyle v. Kansas 926 (1947) it is significant that no reference to the terms "prosecutor" or "prosecution" is made, the majority of the court sating that where conviction is obtained ". .. by perjured testimony knowingly presented by representatives, of the State, (the defendant) is entitled to a judgment discharging him from custody and the suppression by the State of material evidence will be considered in connection with such a charge." Three concurring justices preferred limiting the rule to responsible relirestptatives of the state. In In re De La Roi, 28 Cal.2d 264, 1x69 P.2d 363, 366, 367, 370 (z946) whereas the court spoke of "prosecuting officials," it also used the broader terms, "representative of the state of California" and-"any officer or officers." Note also the progression in the following seven Maryland cases beginning with Reeder v. Warden, 196 Md. 683, 77 A.zd , (195o) in which the court seemed purposely to avoid using the words "prosecution" or £pro6ecutor."1 To the same effect are Johns v. Warden 96 (1954) , typical fact situations, the courts reverted' to such orthodox language as "prosecution," 'prosecuting authorities," and "prosecuting attorney." However, in view of the fact that these cases relied on the earlier broader cases and that the subsequent cases of Barker v. Warden whether these courts have adopted that decision in its broadest aspects or whether they are blind to other than its most salient implications.
13
Other cases, too, have contained language that appears to depart from the narrow construction of the Mooney rule but which may, in riality, rather have been intended only as a slightly different wording of the same general rule. 14
